Who Do You Complain To About the Government? Somebody Who Cannot Be Sacked for It

The role is to investigate complaints from members of the public about how an organisation has treated them, independently of both the complainant and the organisation, and to reach a finding. The investigation is inquisitorial rather than adversarial, so the official gathers evidence and questions the body directly rather than hearing two sides argue, which suits complainants who have no lawyer and no resources. Findings typically identify maladministration, meaning failures of process, delay, rudeness, bias or failure to follow the body's own rules, rather than deciding whether a decision was legally wrong, which is what courts do. Remedies recommended include apology, explanation, correction of the error and financial compensation.

Several features are common across countries and are what give the role force:

• •Independence from the body being investigated and from ministers
• •Appointment and removal arranged so the official cannot be dismissed for findings
• •Power to require documents and to question staff
• •Free access for complainants, with no fee and no need for a lawyer
• •Publication of reports, which supplies the pressure that compels compliance
• •A requirement to exhaust the body's own complaints process first

Sweden created the office in 1809 as part of a new constitution, establishing a parliamentary official to supervise the application of law by the courts and administration on behalf of the legislature rather than the crown, and the Swedish word for that role has passed into English and many other languages unchanged. The idea spread slowly at first, reaching Finland in 1920 and Denmark in 1955, and then very rapidly, with New Zealand adopting it in 1962 and dozens of countries following over the next two decades. Britain created a parliamentary version in 1967, followed by ones for local government, health and eventually a large number of industry schemes.

Reading a published annual report shows what these offices spend their time on, and it is rarely dramatic. Delay is the largest single category almost everywhere, covering decisions not made, correspondence not answered and processes that stall for months. Failure to follow the organisation's own published procedure is the next. Poor communication, including not explaining a decision and not telling somebody what to do next, accounts for a great deal. Errors in calculating entitlements are a steady stream. Clinical and professional judgement is mostly excluded from investigation. And a large proportion of complaints received are rejected without investigation, usually because the body's own process has not been exhausted or because the matter belongs to a court.

Criticism of these offices is consistent and concerns power rather than intent. Most cannot compel a body to do anything, relying instead on publication and on the expectation of compliance, and while compliance rates are generally high, a body determined to refuse can do so. Several schemes require a complaint to be referred by an elected representative rather than brought directly, which deters people and which Britain retains for the parliamentary office. Caseloads exceed capacity, producing waits of many months. Awareness is low, so the people most likely to need the service are least likely to know it exists. And industry-funded schemes covering private companies raise an obvious question about independence from the firms that pay for them.

An independent official investigates complaints inquisitorially, gathering evidence directly rather than hearing two sides, and finds maladministration rather than legal error. Independence, security of tenure, access to documents, free access for complainants and publication of reports are what give the office force. Sweden created it in 1809 and it spread worldwide from the 1960s. Most cannot compel compliance and rely on publication instead.