Why Not Pick Politicians at Random? Athens Did, for Almost Everything

Most Athenian public positions were filled by drawing lots among citizens who put themselves forward, rather than by voting. The council of five hundred that prepared business for the assembly was selected this way annually, with places allocated across the districts of the city. Juries of several hundred were drawn by lot on the day, from a pool of volunteers, using a machine of stone slots and coloured tokens designed specifically to make the draw visibly impossible to rig. Most magistracies were also allotted. Election was reserved for a small number of roles, notably military command, where specific competence was considered essential.

The reasoning was explicit and is preserved in ancient writing:

• •Every citizen has an equal chance, which election does not give
• •It removes the advantage of wealth, family and reputation
• •Nobody can campaign for a position that is drawn by lot
• •Bribery is pointless when the officeholder is unknown in advance
• •Rotation means a large share of citizens actually hold office
• •Officials know they will shortly be ordinary citizens again

Selecting people at random for public office would be reckless without controls, and the Athenians built several. Anybody allotted underwent an examination before taking up the post, at which their eligibility and conduct could be challenged. Terms were short, generally a year, and most positions could not be held twice. Most were exercised by boards rather than by individuals, so no one person could act alone. Every official faced a compulsory audit of their conduct and accounts at the end of the term, and could be prosecuted. And the assembly of all citizens retained the decisions that mattered, so allotted officials administered rather than ruled.

The method has serious weaknesses and its advocates generally acknowledge them. Competence is not selected for at all, which matters more for a technical role than for a jury. Randomly chosen people have no mandate, since nobody voted for them and nobody can vote them out, which is a real democratic objection rather than a quibble. Accountability is weak, because a person leaving after one term faces no consequence for a bad decision. Participation is uneven, since those able to give up weeks of time differ systematically from those who cannot, and compensation only partly fixes that. And a body selected once cannot develop the institutional knowledge that repeated service builds.

The method has returned in a specific form, as citizens' assemblies convened to consider a single contested question. Participants are selected at random from the population and then filtered to match it demographically, sit for a number of weekends, hear from experts and from advocates on each side, deliberate in facilitated small groups and produce recommendations. Ireland used one on constitutional questions including abortion, and its recommendation was put to a referendum in 2018 and passed. France, Canada, Belgium and several cities have run comparable exercises on climate policy and electoral reform. The recurring criticism is that recommendations are frequently ignored, which makes the exercise consultative rather than democratic.

Drawing officeholders by lot gives every citizen an equal chance, makes campaigning impossible and makes bribery pointless, which is why Athens used it for its council, its juries and most magistracies while electing only military commanders. Examination before taking office, one-year terms, collective boards and a compulsory audit afterwards were the controls. Modern citizens' assemblies revive the method for single questions.